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1. Introduction 
China has recently pledged to make “infomatization” the leading engine in its quest for 
developing the country and reinvigorating the economy. Among a wide range of promising new 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), the Internet of Things (IoT) is widely praised for 
having the potential to severely alter anything from manufacturing to medical care, as it allows for any 
object or process to be digitally connected and managed, and therefore optimized. Chinese 
policymakers have thus incorporated IoT-technology and services in its economic and social 
development plans.  However, as internet-use in China was quickly regulated and controlled by the 
Chinese state to avoid the spreading of public discontent and social unrest, it remains to be seen how 
the Chinese state will deal with an internet made ubiquitous through IoT-technology – and if this new 
technology will ultimately harm the one-party rule, or if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be 
able to harness the power of the IoT to strenghten its rule as it has done with the internet.1 
By analysing the Chinese IoT-policy, I hope to identify what the overal plans and the main 
themes are for IoT-development envisioned by Chinese policymakers and how this fits in wider plans 
of “informatization”. More specifically, I will focus on how and if it is stated in these documents that 
the IoT is to be used to improve the state’s governing capacity in the form of e.g. improving social 
management, creating feedback mechanisms, and/or build surveillance networks. As more dependency 
on technology comes with more risks, the importance of improved security for ICTs and the IoT in 
particular as mentioned in Chinese policy will also be discussed. Hereby, I hope to answer the 
question whether or not the widespread adoption of more advanced ICTs, such as the IoT, by the 
Chinese state, will ultimately improve and expand the state’s governing capacity and thus strengthen 
its rule, or if it will make the state more dependent on technology that it can’t control and thus weaken 
its power. 
The outline of my dissertation includes the following: firstly, I will discuss the IoT-technology 
and its projected development and capabilities to be able to assess how much the IoT can or will 
change current internet-enabled socio-political relations; secondly, I will examine the state of current 
                                                     
1 Following Curran et al. (2012), I will refrain of referring to the internet with a capital “I”. Just like the 
telephone or the radio before it, it is just a communication technology after all.  
4 
 
internet- use and -control in China to then elaborate on the literature on the Chinese plans for 
“informatization” and their consequences for Chinese state power. After the methodology-section 
follows the analysis which consists of two parts: the first part deals with general IoT-policy to identify 
the main themes in envisioned IoT-development, and the second part deals with more specific IoT-
development plans to identify concrete examples of how the IoT is to be used to increase the state’s 
governing capacity according to Chinese policymakers. 
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2. The IoT: Prospects and profits  
The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the latest additions to the information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). In essence, the IoT consists of multiple “smart things” connected 
to the internet and also connected to each other. These “things” can range from anything “smart” or 
“digital-first” – that is: devices that are made to connect to the internet such as smart phones, smart 
wrist bands, smart thermometers, smart toasters, smart locks, drones, self-driving cars, …  – to 
“physical-first” objects that are made to connect to the internet through attaching a microchip to it 
(Greengard 2015: 16-7). Connected things can exchange data between devices, and thus provide 
valuable information in areas and on a scale which was previously impossible (ibid.). The possibilities 
for connecting devices to the internet are seemingly endless. IoT devices are fundamentally changing 
the internet as, unlike most previous web-applications, the IoT devices and services have a direct 
impact on the physical world. 
The IoT has been lauded for having the potential of being a “second wave of a powerful 
digital revolution that began with the widespread adoption of computers” and thus commencing an 
“Industry 4.0” (ibid: xiv, 51).2 Accordingly, predictions are that by 2020, 20.8 billion devices will be 
connected worldwide, while in 2016 that was about 6.4 billion devices (Gartner 2015). Still other 
predictions put the number on over 50 million devices by 2020 (Cisco 2014). The application service 
revenue of the IoT is estimated to be around $1.3 trillion by 2025 (Machina Research 2016). Even 
though the technology still is in an “early adapter phase”, according to Greengard (2015: xviii), the 
question is not so much over “whether the IoT will take place,” rather “how exactly it will happen and 
how much it will change the world.” 
What makes the IoT so revolutionary according to its pundits, is not so much as in having so 
many more devices connected to the internet; rather its success lies in the fact that each of these 
devices tracks data (Greengard 2015). Especially in areas where this before was not so much possible, 
such as in the manufacturing process or in logistic chains. This allows for a much deeper insight in 
these processes; as for example damage or wear and tear to equipment can be detected and dealt with 
                                                     
2 The previous waves of industrial innovation are the adaption of mechanization, mass production, and the 
introduction of computers and electronics (Greengard 2015).  
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instantly, or the usage of a certain product can be monitored from a central data-control point to, based 
on the immediate feedback of the data, further improve the product (ibid.).3  This data in turn can then 
be used in combination with “big data” techniques to achieve greater oversight and insight in certain 
processes, and ultimately achieve greater efficiency, reduce costs and obtain greater profits (ibid).4 So 
it is in its marriage with big data, but also cloud services, mobile technology and even social media 
that the IoT can achieve its full potential. As data can be generated, stored, aggregated and triangulated, 
all from multiple and different platforms, all with seemingly infinite possibilities and applications as it 
will in time encompass all industrial and increasingly also many social processes (ibid.).5  
In China, the IoT-industry has already been well underway for a couple of years and all major 
ICT businesses such as Huawei, Alibaba, Xiaomi, Baidu, Tencent, ZTE; together with the three 
telecom providers China Unicom, China Telecom and China Mobile, are competing heavily to capture 
domestic and international markets. The IoT-market in China in 2015 was worth up to 750 billion 
RMB and accounted for 31% of the global total (ECNS 2016). These businesses all realize that the IoT, 
combined with technologies such as 5G mobile communications, cloud computing, big data analytics, 
and even virtual or augmented reality, could be the future of ICTs, and that the next big technological 
push may well come from one of the many research facilities in China (SCMP 2017). Businesses in 
industries as diverse as transportation, medicine, agriculture, military, social management, and public 
                                                     
3  A famous example of this is the Rolls-Royce jet engines that are being monitored worldwide for their 
performance and behaviour and to implement predictive maintenance (Robinson 2016). Similar techniques are 
being used for oil-drilling equipment, freight trains … but also to track information of trees and even livestock 
like cows (Greengard 2015).  
4 It is however important to note that for many manufacturers, the IoT is not about “just the attaching of a sensor 
or chip to any product or any part of the production or customer usage process”. What the IoT is enabling is a 
complete metamorphosis of the manufacturing industry towards a model of “servitization”. In this businesses 
model, companies don’t just sell products anymore, but they offer the product to be used by the customer as a 
service (Neely 2007). In this sense, Rolls-Royce stopped from selling jet engines to selling “power-by-the-hour” 
in which Rolls-Royce offers its customers the service of providing them with always-reliable power for it planes, 
as Rolls-Royce will constantly be monitoring the engine for predictive maintenance so the product is always in a 
state where it can function without errors (Neely 2013). But the same is happening for example in your future 
smart home: your smart fridge does not just want to warn you when you are in the shop that you should buy milk 
because you just finished your last pack this morning. No, perhaps the manufacturer of your smart fridge (or of 
your smart home in its totality) will maybe want to make a deal with the shop so they can automatically bring 
you your product and you never again run out of milk. By offering a service, not a product, the interests of the 
manufacturers and the customer are more aligned and this offers ways for companies to offer businesses services 
of higher value and thus move up the value chain (Baines et al. 2009). 
5 Atzori et al. (2010) identify four domains in which IoT-applications can be deployed: transportation and 
logistics, healthcare, smart environment (this includes the home, office and plant), and the personal and social 
domain. The applications really seem endless as basically every device can be made be part of the IoT by 
attaching a microprocessor to it.  
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security are implementing the technology; 6  but consumer goods such as wearables, smart home 
appliances and connected cars are also in increasingly high demand (GSMA 2015).  
This great leap that China has made in the field of innovation and manufacturing, as the 
country now holds many leading technology businesses and research institutes, is part of an elaborate 
plan by the top government to transform the country into a “manufacturing superpower” over the 
coming decades (State Council 2015; Wübbeke et al. 2016). With a focus on “smart manufacturing”, 
things like the IoT, but also big data analytics, cloud computing, mobile technology, and the likes, are 
prone to become key for the Chinese industry and its economy as a whole. There are however some 
issues and potential pitfalls surrounding the IoT, which will continue to shape its implementation. I 
will firstly turn to these, in order to then give an overview of the adoption and development of ICTs in 
China in order to be able to assess how the IoT will be used in China and what then the possible 
impact will be on Chinese society and politics.   
 
2.1. Security, surveillance, and countersurveillance in the IoT  
Before the IoT can reach its full potential, there are still some issues to be resolved. In terms of 
technology, there is still work to be done in developing batteries for mobile devices that last longer, 
finding ways to embed sensors in everything from clothing to machinery, and developing standards 
and platforms to enable and maintain compatibility between devices, networks and data streams 
(Greengard 2015; Drake et al. 2016). But as the home, the office, and the entirety of the public domain 
become a sensor network that constantly collects information about individuals and possibly shares it 
with third parties, privacy also is a major concern for the IoT (Atzori et al. 2010). Especially since 
most of the IoT-devices will be controlled by other people, governments or businesses (Ziegeldorf et 
al. 2014). 
The IoT’s greatest pitfall however is its low security standard. As became clear in two major 
cyberattacks in late 2016,7 most of these devices connected to the internet are barely secured and also 
                                                     
6 A good example of the sprawling IoT in China is the many security cameras being used throughout the country, 
mostly in cities (cf. Zeng 2016). But many other IoT-applications are still being developed and tested before 
being implemented more widely. 
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have no way to receive security updates or patches, and unlike computers, they are usually used for 
longer periods of time (Schneier 2016a).8  As the IoT increasingly collects valuable data – from 
financial transactions or important businesses insiders to personal data, it can become a hot target for 
hackers, especially since it is known it is easy to hack. Moreover, every technology can be used for 
malicious purposes, but with the IoT, the impact into the physical world can be severe and even fatal 
as it involves applications such as driverless cars or drones that could be comprised by malicious 
actors (Greengard 2015).  
Many scholars and instances have thus warned about the possible dangers of the IoT and the 
need for industry-led security standards (Goldstein 2016; Hamblen 2016; Schneier 2016; Drolet 2016). 
Also in Chinese official and technological discourse, the need to ensure “safe and controllable” 
(anquan kekong) IoT-products and services is stated as being of paramount importance; as it is noticed 
that “as far as implementation [of security measures in the domestic IoT] is concerned; compared to 
abroad, there is still a certain disparity” (CNITSEC 2017: 77).9 Security in IoT is thus becoming an 
important driver for the Chinese IoT-policy and has e.g. already resulted in the international adoption 
of three security standards developed by Chinese researchers in the last two years (ibid.). 
Still, with many issues of technology, security, and ethics still unresolved while the IoT-
products and services are already being put on the market at an incremental pace, it remains to see how 
society will deal with these changes brought about by these devices (Sicari et al. 2015). As Howard 
(2015: 10) writes, “the latest smartphones, watches, and wearable technologies reveal how immersive 
and pervasive the internet of things will be.” 10 Moreover, the internet and the devices we already 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 On September 20 and October 20, 2016, respectively the site of cybersecurity expert Brian Krebs and Dyn, a 
Domain Name Service provider (an important piece of internet infrastructure as it “powers” many websites), 
were attacked by a botnet that was created through the Mirai malware. This malware infects poorly-secured IoT 
devices such as DVRs and internet-connected cameras to turn them into a “bot” that can be used to send data to a 
target. As enough bots do this, in a Distributed Denial-of-Service attack (DDOS), the target shuts down due to an 
overload of information that the site or server can’t process, as happened in these two attacks (Krebs 2016; 
Williams 2016).    
8  According to Schneier (2016b), security for the IoT often is “an externality”, as the buyer only cares about a 
cheap price and the manufacturer is pressured to put its products on the market as he probably is already on to 
developing newer and better secured models. 
9 An important reason that is given for this is the fact that most of the more advanced IoT-technology is 
controlled by foreign companies, which leaves Chinese IoT-production in a “backward position” with inferior 
and insecure technology (CNITSEC 2017: 77).  
10 A nice addition to this list of pervasive IoT-devices is connected sex toys. These devices collect a lot of 
intimate user data and many of them are very poorly secured (BBC 2017; CNET 2017).  
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connect to it now, as a result of severely transforming the way information and communication is 
being channeled, stored and processed, already enables what the leading internet security scholar calls 
“the golden age of surveillance [we are living in]” (Schneier 2015: 4).11  
As many IoT-devices already make up an important part of people’s daily lives (such as smart 
phones, but increasingly also other “networked devices”) and thus are in fact increasingly managing 
our political, economic and cultural lives, control over these devices thus entails enormous power 
(Howard 2015). How will having even more devices connected to the internet impact the power 
relation between the state, big internet corporations and internet users in society? According to 
Howard (2015), this would possibly put more power to the already powerful actors in the internet-era, 
that is: the businesses who offer services and own your data, governments and political leaders with 
strong cyber capabilities, and capable hackers who can get access to valuable data.12 But this is not a 
given. Howard (ibid.) also argues that this new infrastructure can be used by less-powerful actors to 
create own networks of people and information, which in turn can be used to for example advocate for 
better rights or protest against state or corporate actors by presenting own information of for example 
deteriorating quality of nature or government or corporate abuse. This way, because of their 
decentralized nature or advantages of scale, new digital media or infrastructure has already many times 
“caught elites off guard” (ibid: 58). 
In the face of all these changes brought about by rapidly evolving technologies, how does the 
Chinese government cope with it? With the IoT technology and applications, the internet “will be [of] 
a different kind … : larger, more pervasive, and ubiquitous.” (Howard 2015:11); could this mean an 
opportunity for the Chinese leadership, a threat, or both? I.e., in what different ways does the Chinese 
government engage with a technology such as the IoT? These are the questions I would like to answer. 
As the People’s Republic of China has a record of controlling media and internet in the country to 
                                                     
11 Not only can objects like smartphones track your location through GPS, smart-TVs and laptops listen in to 
what you are doing or watch you through a build-in camera, we willingly share all kinds of personal information 
on social media or disclose it to search engines, our email contacts, or in many other digital – and thus recorded 
– way. Even if we ourselves would not use social media or the internet, it is most likely that much of your 
personal information would end up on the internet anyway through other people’s social media or blog postings 
(Schneier 2015; Zuboff 2015).   
12 For more on who holds power on the internet and thus has an important part in shaping, governing, and 
controlling the internet, its resources and its infrastructure cfr. Lessig (2006); Mueller (2010); Schiller (2014).  
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avoid any kind of social unrest, how will it then deal with the possibly very disruptive IoT? To be able 
to assess that, I will first give an overview of how ICTs have been adopted and developed in China. 
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3. ICTs in China: Building resilience 
With the advent of the internet, many pundits in the West were celebrating what would be the 
end of many authoritarian regimes as information would spread freely and uncontested across borders 
and walls to “liberate” oppressed people by showing them how they are being oppressed and what 
freedom and opportunities awaits them if they manage to get rid of their shackles (Rutten 2009). The 
Chinese government recognized at an early stage the internet’s potential for improving and 
accelerating its economy while also possibly posing the risk to “disrupt” society in a to the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) dangerous way (Creemers 2016). Therefore, the rapid development of its ICT 
infrastructure (with an explosive growth in its amount of internet users as a result), was followed 
relatively quickly by, e.g., crackdowns on social media, elaborate censorship mechanisms, and efforts 
to implement real-name registration systems to remove anonymity from the Web (Tsui 2003; 
MacKinnon 2011; Ng 2013). Through a diverse set of techniques, ranging from governmentality 
(controlling of flows), sovereignty (the application of national laws on cyberspace), to pure 
disciplinary (arrests and fines); control of this space was asserted (Foucault 2004/2007; Paltemaa and 
Vuori 2009).13 
With the country holding the biggest number of internet users in the world and having 
developed a number of major players on the global ICT market (CNNIC 2016; Creemers 2016)14, the 
Chinese internet is flourishing despite the controlling measures (Yang 2009). Moreover, the 
Communist Party seems confident to rely ever more on the internet as it is adamant in making 
“informatization” (xinxihua) the “main power driving the country’s overall economic and social 
development” (Qu 2010), with the ultimate goal of becoming a “strong Internet power” (wangluo 
qiangguo) (Creemers 2016). Despite that many voices have claimed that China has reached “the 
                                                     
13 Authoritarian regimes control measures on the internet or in which the internet is used are, as those of the CCP, 
often portrayed as creating an Orwellian nightmare of total control and surveillance (i.e., the state as “Big 
Brother”); while the internet as a Huxleyan, hedonistic entertainment-bonanza is often not accounted for 
(Morozov 2011). In the case of China, the power of the internet is thus used by the CCP both as a stick (in the 
form of censorship and ubiquitous surveillance) and a carrot (in the form of endless entertainment and new forms 
of propaganda through the many apps and platforms). Cf. Schneider 2016; (forthcoming). 
14 Its number of netizens surpassed that of the United States in 2008 and by June 2016, China had 710 million 
internet users. With 51.7% internet penetration, users may well continue to grow, especially in rural areas 
(CNNIC 2016).  
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tipping point” due to a number of factors such as protests emerging from inequalities caused by the 
market reforms, widespread corruption within the Party and state (Brødsgaard 2013), and also because 
of the presumed “liberating effect of the internet”;15 the CCP has so far proved very resilient in the 
face of these many challenges, and no break with one-party system or the current leadership seems due 
(Nathan 2003). Moreover, almost exactly like the adoption of a market economy – which was adopted 
only after making some strategic tweaks and balances – has seemed to make the Party stronger (Pieke 
2016), so also by customizing the internet, the CCP could stay in control and make this new, 
seemingly omnipotent technology cater to its every need.  
In what scholars have called “revolutionary authoritarianism” (Zhao 2008), “networked 
authoritarianism” (MacKinnon 2011) or “iDictatorship” (Austin 2014), the Chinese leadership aims 
for the appropriation of “the power of information technology to tackle the Party’s key challenges in 
propaganda, public opinion and social management [for the purpose of] maintaining stability, ensuring 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominance, preventing organized opposition and enhancing intra-
Party discipline” (Creemers 2016: 4). By placing the internet (and technology in general) in the centre 
of an ambitious reform agenda (ibid.), the focus is very much on innovation to improve the 
government’s governing capacity (People’s Daily 2011).16  
Due to the success of the (intended) commodification of technology by the Chinese leadership, 
and the fact that social, economic and political transactions now increasingly play out on the internet 
(Lu and Weber 2007); there is an enormous potential for the government to tap into all the data that is 
being generated on the internet (Creemers 2016). This could exponentially increase the grasp on 
Chinese society by the Chinese leadership in many ways: e.g., by using this data as a real-time, much 
more accurate set of statistics (ibid.), by surveilling the populous with elaborate CCTV networks and 
by tracking people’s phones; all the way down to monitoring people’s phone and internet usage (Zeng 
                                                     
15 Perhaps rising discontent due to deteriorated air quality and environmental standards could now also be added 
to this list.  
16 In the 2011 18th Party Congress report, the term “social management” was used to replace “e-government” and 
by invoking “social management” the Party calls for governmental organs at all levels to innovate to “improve 
the online services and advocate healthy themes on the internet. … [S]trengthen social management of the 
internet and promote orderly network operations in accordance with laws and regulations. [And] crack down on 
pornography and illegal publications and resist vulgar trends” (quoted in Noesselt 2014: 456). According to 
Zeng (2016: 1452), “social management … refers to social control activities while downplaying its coercive 
connotations”.  
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2016). All this would possibly allow the CCP to act timely and even pre-emptively to avoid or limit 
the damage of economic fall-outs, natural disasters, social unrest, or other disruptive events with the 
ultimate goal of creating “a predictable political environment” (Creemers 2016: 13). 
 
3.1. The IoT: Changing the game 
Most of the scholarship studying Chinese state action with regards to the internet has focussed 
on the web as constituting the social web, also called Web 2.0 (Creemers 2016). Web 2.0 consists of 
an internet of user-generated content, ease of use, and interoperability (DiNucci 1998). This has led to 
a flourishing of diverse applications such as social networking, blogs, crowd-sourcing, video-
sharing, … , as it gave the possibility to anyone with an internet connection to “actively” contribute to 
the internet (ibid.).17 Due to the success of many of these Web 2.0 applications in China and the 
following harshness of the government measures to counter online government criticism and 
mobilization, topics such as censorship, astroturfing, online feedback mechanisms have already been 
studied extensively.18  
However, as the internet, through the IoT and other technologies, evolves from Web 2.0 to 
encompass all aspects of life, concerns also rise about the internet being used as a potent tool for 
surveillance and social management, for hacking and espionage, even up to sabotage and warfare. In 
the Chinese domestic context, Creemers (2016) has recently focused on how the CCP tends to use 
rapid evolving internet technology to “upgrade” its propaganda, public opinion work and social 
management, while Zeng (2016), focusing on Big Data, 19 has shown how this technology is used to 
greatly increase the state’s surveillance capabilities and could potentially also be used to monitor the 
                                                     
17 This is in contrast to the “passive” consumption of Web 1.0 websites (DiNucci 1998). 
18 Cf. Ng (2013); King et al. (2013) on censorship, King et al. (2017) on astroturfing, Tsang (2009); He and 
Warren (2011) on government deliberative mechanisms using the internet, and Schlaeger and Jiang (2014) on 
government use of social media.  
19 As the development of big data was officially announced by the State Council of China in November 2015, 
thus making it into a national strategy (Creemers 2016); Zeng (2016: 1444) does argue that big data in China is 
not a uniform concept and is sometimes used as a catchphrase, so the approach of the Chinese government to big 
data “is best considered as a broad and less than coherent strategy of adaptation to governance by electronic 
means.”  
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opinions and ideological trends of students and soldiers – and adjust where necessary.20 As intrusive as 
these matters may appear, it seems that the biggest obstacles for the Chinese leadership to implement 
these plans and more, are merely of a practical or technical nature as it does not lack the means and 
will to do so, and because civil society or awareness of civil rights is too weak to oppose it (Zeng 
2016).21  
However, these ambitious plans don’t come without risks. Besides the security concerns of 
having increasing amounts of personal data stored and therefore increasing the danger of data breaches 
(as these servers or data centers will also become a hot target for foreign intelligence services and 
hackers) (ChinaFile 2016), Creemers (2016) also warns that as the government will be more aware of 
crimes or abuses, it will also be held more accountable for not acting on the information. Additionally, 
Zeng (2016: 1458) also warns for the potential danger of sensitive data (generated from people’s 
internet usage or activities under surveillance) being used in internal Party strife, resulting in a 
possible “authoritarian backfire”.  
Also, as noted above, when it comes to securing the IoT, this remains a big difficulty. As more 
aspects of public life, the economy and critical infrastructure (such as power grids, banks, …) operate 
through ICTs, obtaining a higher level of cybersecurity becomes a matter of utmost importance and 
even national security. Security on the Chinese internet is already below standard due to the 
fragmented bureaucracy, the fact that many people use outdated and unsupported operating systems, 
and general public education is inadequate (Lindsay 2015). This causes much harm to the Chinese 
economy on a daily basis (ibid.).22 So especially with a whole industry for connected devices in the 
make, proper security in these devices will be key for obtaining consumer’s trust and fulfilling the 
government’s plans of “informatization” (Creemers 2016). 
                                                     
20 One article examined by Zeng (2016) even talks of ideological indoctrination in the fashion of the increasingly 
effective online advertisements (Hu and Huang 2014).   
21 Some of these plans can also prove to be too politically dangerous for parts of the Chinese leadership, as has 
happened with a pilot for the “Social Credit System”, a modern version of the dang’an system that uses 
innovative technologies (such as social media, apps and big data) to rate citizens for “good” or “patriotic” 
behaviour online and offline (FT 2016). The criteria used for rating behaviour are politically controversial and 
often far-fetched, making it that there will be some hard political choices that will have to be made before a 
pervasive system like that can succeed (Economist 2016).  
22 Zhuge et al. (2012) estimate that the overall damage to the Chinese economy exceeded 5.36 billion RMB 
($USD 0.852 billion) in 2011, affecting 110.8 million Chinese users (about 22 percent of all Chinese internet 
users at the time) and 1.1 million websites (or 20 percent of all Chinese websites at the time).  
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4. Methodology 
With the Chinese leadership boasting such ambitions concerning the development of the 
internet and for using innovative means to increase its governing capacity, it is therefore relevant to 
look at government policy and policy recommendations to have an idea of how this technology-driven 
vision of good governance will materialize (Creemers 2016; Zeng 2016). The IoT, as it has been 
lauded by industry and government alike to being able to “read China” in unprecedented ways, will 
therefore be my focus of study. By looking at IoT-development policy in China, I want to find out how 
the CCP envisions using the IoT not only to generate economic growth but more importantly to 
increase its grasp on Chinese society in different ways. Therefore I will look at the main themes 
brought up in these documents and the concrete examples given where is stated how the IoT is to be 
used for e.g. improving social management, creating feedback mechanisms, and/or build better 
surveillance systems. 
Moreover, as Chinese society becomes more reliant on internet-enabled systems and the 
Chinese leadership does too, the CCP is constantly trying to use innovative means of improving its 
governance capacity; cybersecurity becomes a crucial element in all these “informatization” plans – as 
without proper security many of the technologies and devices become useless or even dangerous. 
However, discussing cybersecurity policies of the IoT is goes beyond the scope of this thesis and will 
only be touched upon shortly where necessary. With these two elements; how the IoT is envisioned to 
be used for improving the governing capacity of the Chinese state, and how these plans should be 
secured, I argue that a successfully developed IoT on the terms of the CCP, could make the Chinese 
leadership possibly ever more resilient as it will have always increasingly accurate information on 
much more of the goings-on in Chinese society.   
The scope of the study entails all the Chinese policy documents from the beginning of the 
policy on IoT-development in 2009 and the more general technology policy linked to the policy for the 
development of the IoT, until policies issued at the beginning of 2017 (around March). The general 
outline of the thesis will be as following: I will first give an overview on the general IoT-development 
policy in China to identify the main themes discussed in these documents in which the Chinese 
16 
 
leadership wants to see the IoT developed and why. In the second part, I will elaborate on the more 
concrete usages of the IoT as discussed in these policy documents. More specifically, I will focus on 
these IoT-usages which could improve the Chinese government’s social management and surveillance 
capabilites.23  
For an overview of the used policy documents and speeches, see table 1 in the appendix. Also, 
I included the documents used for analysis in the references for clarity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 Following Rexhepi (2016), who argues that caring for surveillance is a “liberal luxury” that many people that 
have to struggle for food or survival on a daily basis or people who are used to many intrusive state (and 
corporate) surveillance schemes based on their low position in society, race, gender or religion; it is important to 
note that solely focussing on (state) surveillance from a Chinese perspective also risks of missing the wider 
power dynamics between state and society in Chinese society and the myriad of ways in which these dynamics 
take shape to reiterate the status quo (cf. Foucault 1988).   
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5. IoT-policy in China 
Constituting such a promising new turn for industry, the IoT has thus been on the cross hairs 
of Chinese policy makers for some time. The recipe for IoT development has remained the same as it 
goes for other new ICTs such as big data, cloud computing, and mobile internet; the development of 
IoT technology and services, and the creation of a “vanguard” of successful businesses capable of 
competing on international markets, is seen as a prerequisite for the IoT (together with symbiotic 
technologies such as the cloud and big data) to aid in the country’s overall development and to help 
resolve a certain set of persistent issues in Chinese society (cf. Creemers 2016; Zeng 2016). However, 
due to the nature of the IoT, it is identified by Chinese policymakers as being particularly useful to 
help tackle some problems that big data or mobile computing alone are not designed to fix.  
By going over policy documents related to the “informatization” agenda and to the IoT 
specifically, I will identify the main themes in IoT-policy to be able to gauge the Chinese leadership’s 
ambitions concerning ICTs, and critically analyze these. First I will discuss the “guiding” policy, the 
policy which mostly comes from the high authority of the State Council and serves to lead to more 
detailed or practical documents issued by ministries or other government organs, as these documents 
always refer to these leading texts.  
 
5.1. “Reading China”: Setting the scope for IoT-development 
The IoT was recognized in premier Li Keqiang’s 2015 Government Work rapport as being a 
vital part of the country’s ambition of making the country into a “strong internet power” (wangluo 
qiangguo), together with mobile internet, big data and cloud computing.24 This new turn in technology 
policy, which he coined “Internet Plus”, was set out in an elaborate implementation plan to ensure 
these information technologies are being leveraged to achieve stable economic growth and 
development for the country as a whole.25  
                                                     
24 State Council, ‘2015 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao’ (2015 Government Work Report), March 5, 2015. 
25 State Council, “Guanyu jiji tuijin ‘Hulianwang+’ xingdong de zhidao yijian” (Guiding Opinions Concerning 
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These policies however were already long in the making. On August 7, 2009, on his third 
inspection trip to Jiangsu province, former premier Wen Jiabao visited the Wuxi Hi-Tech Micro nano 
SensingNet R&D Center of Chinese Academy of Science (中科院无锡高新微纳传感网工程技术研
发中心), a research center for IoT-technology which was founded the previous year in November. 
Once there, Wen called for the “speedy establishment of China’s information sensing center, or by a 
different name: the ‘Reading China’ Center” (‘Ganzhi Zhongguo’ zhongxin).26 From that year on, the 
city of Wuxi, and more specifically its industrial park Wuxi New Area (Wuxi xin qu), was transformed 
to become a “sensing net model city” (chaunganwang shifan chengshi) with the ambition of becoming 
China’s and the world’s top IoT innovation hub.27  
In an official reply to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) in 2012, 
the State Council formally ratified the plan to develop the “Wuxi National Sensing Net Innovation 
Model Area” (锡国家传感网创新示范区).28 In it, the State Council calls upon the MIIT to work 
together with the provincial government to make Wuxi into a success. In the elaborate MIIT 
“Development Plan Outline” for the Wuxi Area, the precise conditions and “guiding principles” of 
Wuxi’s development are given, as is a fairly detailed “development target” with the necessary tasks 
and most important areas in which the IoT should be developed.29 
The Outline identifies the “sensing net” (as a synonym for the IoT), as a “high-end technology 
with comprehensive usage” and a “piece of important substance of the strategic new industry”. 
Moreover, it positions the IoT’s strategic importance in a post-financial crisis world in which the 
developed countries (the United States, Europe and Japan) have a strong competitive advantage in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Vigorously Promoting “Internet Plus” Activities), July 5, 2015. Translation available at: 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2015/07/01/state-council-guiding-opinions-concerning-
vigorously-moving-forward-the-internet-plus-plan/ (accessed 11/06/2017). 
26  ‘Wen Jiabao: jinkuai jianli Zhongguo chuangan xinxi zhongxin’ (Wen Jiabao: speedy establishment of 
China’s information sensing center), Xinhua, August 5, 2010. Available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/eworld/2010-08/05/c_12412927.htm (accessed 11/06/2017). 
27 Mei Fangquan, ‘Zhihui diqiu yu ganzhi zhongguo – wulianwang de fazhan fenxi’ (Smart Earth and Reading 
China - Analysis on Development of Internet of Things), Agricultural Internet Information, vol. 12, 2009, pp. 5-
21. 
28 State Council, ‘Guanyu Wuxi guojia chuanganwang chuangxin shifanqu fazhan guihua gangyao (2012-2020) 
nian de pifu’ (Official Reply Concerning the Wuxi National Sensing Net Innovation Model Area Development 
Plan Outline (2012-2020)), August 5, 2012. 
29 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, ‘Wuxi guojia chuanganwang chuangxin shifanqu fazhan 
guihua gangyao (2012-2020) nian’ (Wuxi National Sensing Net Innovation Model Area Development Plan 
Outline (2012-2020), August 17, 2012. 
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terms of IoT usability and industry development. By doing so, it legitimizes China to, from its 
acknowledged relatively weak position, try to close the gap with these countries and create a set of 
internationally-renowned IoT businesses itself. As far as the Wuxi Area is concerned, this approach 
seems to already be proving successful with the private sector gladly taking advantage of the favorable 
conditions set up by the state. Reportedly, close to two thousand IoT-businesses have settled in the 
Area and the industry worth exceeded 150 billion yuan in 2017.30  
The vigor of the Outline resembles that of a State Council document issued in 2010, about a 
year after Wen’s visit at Wuxi. The document, entitled “Decision on Accelerating the Fostering and 
Development of Strategic Emerging Industries”, seeks to build on the success of the then more than 30 
years' rapid development since the reform and opening-up policy was adopted and aims to further 
tackle “major problems” such as “a weak enterprise technology innovation capability, few controlled 
key and core technologies, incomplete policy and regulation systems facilitating the market access of 
new technologies and new products; and imperfect investment, financing, fiscal and taxation policies, 
systems and mechanisms supporting innovation and venture capital.”.31 Many of the more practical 
IoT-development policy documents that will be discussed in next section refer to this document. 
By indicating the strategic importance of the IoT and other technologies, which was enforced 
in the following year in the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan”, the development of these technologies is set up 
as one of the most important goals for the nation as a whole.32 The importance and urgency in calling 
for the development of these “new generation information technology industries”, is then a direct 
forerunner of later technology policy such as the “Internet Plus” agenda or the “National 
Informatization Development Strategy” which aim to make these technologies as the core of Chinese 
economy and society. In doing so, it acknowledges the dire need for further economic development as 
China’s economy is starting to struggle to keep up with its former growth rates, and that this growth is 
                                                     
30 Wuxi New Area Investment, ‘2017 shijie wulianwang bolanhui yi zai jin luo mi gu choubei’ (The 2017 World 
IoT Fair is already starting Preparations), February 7, 2017. http://cn.bizwnd.gov.cn/2017-02/07/c_50197.htm 
(accessed 11/06/2017). 
31 State Council, ‘Guanyu jiakuai peiyu he fazhan zhanlüexing xinxing chanye de jueding’ (Decision of the State 
Council on Accelerating the Fostering and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries), October 10, 2010. 
Translation available at: http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=139218&lib=law (accessed 11/06/2017). 
32 National People’s Congress, ‘Di shier ge wunianguihua gangyao’ (Twelfth Five-Year Guideline), March 14, 
2011. 
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most likely to be obtained by applying ever more advanced technologies in the country’s economy, 
thus making these technologies of the uttermost strategic significance.  
The Wuxi document published by the MIIT already outlines the broad scope of possible IoT 
applications in which the government has strong interest to see the technology developed. Through its 
pragmatic nature of not only identifying these key fields of usage for IoT, but also how to achieve 
successes in them, the document already much so sets the tone for later, more specific IoT 
development policy, which will be discussed in the next section.  
The three main areas identified for IoT-development are industrial processes concerned with 
manufacturing, storage and logistics, to improve management and safety; improving management 
capabilities and safety measures for government facilities; and making improvements in the field of 
social management and public service. The second, with its “quick-response capabilities to sudden 
incidents and environment monitoring and protection capabilities”, does not sound very innocuous in 
the hands of an authoritarian regime, if these capabilities would be used to control and limit the actions 
of individuals or groups. As Zeng (2016: 1452) points out the “coercive connotations” of “social 
management” in China, it remains to be seen in what way it is stated more clearly in these documents 
how exactly the IoT is envisioned to be used for this.  
Further in the document are these three main areas distilled in “eight big usage model 
constructions” which give a clearer view of what is included in the three main areas and what the most 
important issues are in IoT development according to the CCP. These eight categories are: 
manufacturing, electric power, logistics, traffic, public security, environmental protection, medical 
treatment, and house appliances. The eight categories already show that plans are to use IoT-
technology in all facets of industry, but also much of public life and into people’s private lives. This 
comprehensive plan shows how a “smart” city model like this could leave little of public life (through 
e.g. smart traffic and ubiquitous cameras and sensors), and parts of private life (through e.g. smart 
home devices), undocumented and possibly unregulated.  
Among the specific applications are described: using the electric grid for monitoring with data 
from smart meters as entrance point or using “high towers for emergency relief”, surveillance 
mechanisms covering focal areas to “prevent intrusions” and improve city’s public management, to 
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creating a public security platform for surveillance, early warnings and emergency relief; using smart 
home appliances to improve the quality of life for families, their safety, informatization, and energy 
reduction, and this up onto the level of the community.  
The example from the “electric power” section does specify further in the section that the 
monitoring, which should occur in a centralized manner, is to ensure the “safety, stability and 
reliability of the smart electric net”. As in the other cases, the schemes described here do not have any 
inherent malign intent (to for example stating to want to create a totalitarian “1984”-like state) but are 
made to serve common ends of e.g. public service or state building, such as using this technology to 
tackle pollution or flooding, or prevent people from breaking into your house. Still, the same or similar 
schemes could also be used to closer monitor people’s actions and prevent them from criticizing the 
government or mobilize to stage a protest. It is therefore important to be wary of such elaborate 
schemes as the data generated by this technology or the surveillance capabilities that it allows for, can 
always be used for other purposes as e.g. targeting and silencing opposition to the state.33   
The document also requires all technology to be of a certain standard, to be “manageable and 
controllable” (keguan kekong) and is very specific on the different areas of IoT it seeks to cover. 
Moreover, compatibility between systems and devices (meaning they use compatible standards) and 
data processing (in the form of big data analysis, real-time data banks, and smart analysis and 
decision-making) are also stated of being key to a successful IoT development.  
An important goal of the policy is to create “significant model example constructions” which 
can then be exported to different localities and also be successful there so that the demanded “increase 
in spreading efforts” is obtained. To assure the success of the policy, the document also asks for the 
establishment of a national-level IoT science & technology university campus in Wuxi, as also to set 
up a coordinating small leading group that can complement this document with more specific policy to 
ensure a successful development of the Wuxi Area.  
                                                     
33 I choose these examples as they make for the most recognizable cases of possible privacy infringements. But 
with the whole environment turning into a “smart” environment, issues of ubiquitous data aggregation and 
possible damaging uses of data analytics (e.g. in the form of inhibiting freedoms or reaffirming existing biases), 
obviously span much wider and also include e.g. smart vehicles and smart medical equipment (cf. Boyd and 
Crawford 2012; O’Neil 2016).  
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Approximately half a year after the Wuxi documents, the missing, more comprehensive 
ideological guidance is then provided for in the “Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Promoting 
the Orderly and Healthy Development of the Internet of Things”, published by the State Council.34 In 
this top-level document, the high demand for IoT-development is set out, as the technology is said to 
possess the “characteristics of having strong permeability, driving on a wide field of usage, and having 
good all-around benefits”. According to the document, the IoT is of strategic importance for 
improving the level of informatization of the Chinese economy and society, and it is “beneficial to the 
advancement of the change in orientation in style of production, living and social management 
towards smartization, refinement and internetization”. These are terms that will reappear in many of 
the more practical development policy documents discussed in the next section. 
The IoT’s strategic importance is underscored in this document as it is stated that, besides it 
being vital for the informatization of Chinese economy and society (as was already mentioned in the 
2010 State Council document), it is also crucial for the “deepening of military-civil integration” 
(junmin ronghe) and even for the construction of national defense, as is mentioned in respectively the 
“guiding thought” and “basis principles” of the document. This is further reinforced with the 
“safeguarding measure” of “setting up robust IoT development coordinating mechanisms between 
ministries, industries, regions, and the army”. 
The document also stands out for the importance placed on the need for innovating in social 
management, but does not elaborate on what that actually entails. It does however says that the to be 
constructed “smartizised” social management and public service systems should be “highly effective, 
safe and reliable” (anquan kekao). This is slightly different from the important “basic principle” in the 
text of “safe and controllable” (anquan kekong), which comes as a strong prerequisite as China is 
transforming into an information society which depends on the reliability of its technology. As a 
“safeguarding measure”, it is stated that information security, together with privacy protection, should 
be improved by setting up laws and regulations.  
                                                     
34  State Council, ‘Guanyu tuijin wulianwang youxu jiankang fazhan de zhidao yijian’ (Guiding Opinions 
Concerning Promoting the Orderly and Healthy Development of the Internet of Things), February 5, 2013. 
23 
 
The goal is set out to “create a batch of core technology, build an early form of an IoT industry 
system, and have a clear increase in safety guarantee capabilities.” by 2015. But the real importance of 
the document is that it sets out the general conditions for IoT-development in terms of crucial 
application areas, tasks and principles. By doing so, it sets the tone for the more practical IoT-
development policy that follows this one. The calls in the document’s “safeguarding measures”-
section are also very emblematic for the policy to come, which will be discussed in next section, as it 
states to “speedily set up concrete implementation plans”.35  
The last of the top-level guidance for the IoT concerns the content of a meeting held on 
February 18, 2014 in Beijing on the auspices of the State Council, called the “Nationwide Internet of 
Things Work Television Conference Call Meeting” (quanguo wulianwang gongzuo dianshi dianhua 
huiyi), which was broadcasted on national television.36  The content of the meeting is later referred to 
as the “Spirit of the Nationwide Internet of Things Work Television Conference Call Meeting” 
(quanguo wulianwang gongzuo dianshi dianhua huiyi jingshen) in many more practical policy 
documents on IoT, as they should act in accordance with that “Spirit”.  
The later published draft of the meeting includes summaries of the speeches of the important 
officials and industry leaders who spoke at the meeting, e.g. the mayors of Shenzhen and Wuxi who 
both call for the further development of the IoT in their region, and the speech of vice premier Ma Kai, 
which is of most importance. The deputy director of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) Zhang Xiaoqiang gave a report in which he emphasized the “five plans to be 
stressed for IoT development”. Those are: coordination between key sectors, the coordination of the 
relation between development and safety, focus on local development, the coordination of resource 
sharing, and the coordination of “military-civil integration” development.37 
Ma Kai in his speech very much emphasized using the IoT, not only for the purpose of 
obtaining steady growth and increasing the country’s competitiveness, but also very much for 
                                                     
35 The Wuxi Development Plan Outline also counts to that, as it’s more concrete envisioned IoT-applications for 
development were discussed above. But still it is also an important document to “guide” following IoT-policy as 
it was the first comprehensive plan and because of the importance of the Wuxi Area in the whole national IoT-
development effort.  
36 ‘Quanguo wulianwang gongzuo dianshi dianhua huiyi geji lingdao jianghua zhengligao’ (Nationwide Internet 
of Things Work Television Conference Call Speech Draft), June 24, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.wendangku.net/doc/4f092eea1a37f111f1855bbd.html (accessed 11/06/2017) 
37 Ibid. 
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improving social management capabilities. He stated: “The second point is [the IoT] should benefit 
safeguarding and improving people’s livelihoods. In a broad application in the fields of education, 
medicine, hygiene, social safeguards, community service, managing government affairs, etc., the IoT 
should deepen the transformation of social management, public service and human life; bring about 
innovation in the model of social management and public service; to largely increase the effectiveness 
and level of public service; to drive the improvement in public service; and to better fulfil the needs of 
the masses.” He also quotes chairman Xi: “Let IoT better drive production, enter life, and create 
happiness for the ordinary people.” He also stressed developing the IoT in the face of its poor security 
that still needs tackling, and the policy and legal system which is still not robust.38  
 
5.2. IoT and Informatization 
In these documents, the core requirements of IoT development in China and how to achieve 
these is laid out in a comprehensive big picture complementary to the wider “informatization” plans, 
as for example also laid out in the “Internet Plus” agenda. The central element in these plans for IoT-
development is the strategic importance of the IoT for economic purposes. Flowing from this is the 
social use (in the form of improved social management and public service) of the technology and to 
have the security mechanisms in place to safeguard an economy and society which is regulated for a 
big part through vulnerable technology and hardware. Therefore, the emphasis on local pilot projects 
which, on the basis of “try-first” (xianxing xianshi), should gather experience to be used in other 
localities. This way, the wider plans of “informatization” can be accomplished. By making everything 
“smart”, the legibility of society improves significantly, making it possible to “read China” in 
unprecedented ways and thus gain much more control over society.   
By positioning the IoT as a promise able to generate “stable growth” after the financial crisis 
(as stated in the 2010 State Council document), the IoT also becomes critical to the other goals of the 
Chinese leadership. With the IoT functioning as a new “pole of profitable growth” in today’s economy 
                                                     
38 Ma Kai: Zai quanguo wulianwang gongzuo dianshi dianhua huiyi shang de jianghua (Ma Kai: Speech at the 
Nationwide Internet of Things Work Television Conference Call Meeting), February 18, 2014. Available at: 
https://wenku.baidu.com/view/0885947933687e21ae45a90c.html (accessed 11/06/2017) 
25 
 
(Schiller 2014: 146), its anticipated commodified success thus has the potential to make the IoT (in 
combination with big data analytics and other new technologies) function as a new “scopic regime” 
which could have the potential to give the leadership much more power viz-à-viz its datafied subjects 
(Scott 1998; Cetina 2016). 
The envisioned scope for the IoT is therefore very wide, even all-encompassing; as it is said to 
involve all industry, society and also the realms of people’s homes. There were little concrete 
examples mentioned in the documents discussed here, but the examples given in the Wuxi document 
show already a bit more of the intentions and their possible implementations for the Chinese 
government’s IoT-plans. Such as: using the electric grid (including smart meters) for monitoring, 
elaborate surveillance mechanisms in “focal areas” and systems for early warnings and emergency 
relief, having more smart devices in the home. These examples on itself may perhaps not say much39 
but in the bigger scheme of things, i.e. China’s “informatization” plans, if we combine this 
information with the more recent, more comprehensive Chinese cyber policy, we get a more accurate 
picture in which to scrutinize these IoT-applications.   
For instance, the mentioning of military-civil integration in the 2013 State Council document 
on IoT Development from then onwards also applies to other IoT related policy, such as for the whole 
Wuxi area. But it also has to be seen in the wider context of the Chinese military increasingly 
embracing digital technologies, as is mentioned in the National Informatization Development Strategy 
from 2016, which talks of “Accelerating a strong information army, building a modern military forces 
system” as one of the Informatization goals.40 Similarly, the recent focus on social management in 
Chinese technology policy is difficult to gauge without also e.g. mentioning the recent attempts for 
setting up a Social Credit System. These schemes thrive on the collecting of as much data as possible, 
of both online and offline processes, and sharing it between government institutions and industry. The 
importance for sharing data between different ministries, businesses, localities and even the military is 
                                                     
39 Although there has been already much opposition against many of these practices by privacy advocates, 
including against for example smart meters, but definitely of course ubiquitous CCTV networks and smart home 
devices. Cf. Cuijpers and Koops 2011; Lyon 2001; Ziegeldorf et al. 2014. 
40 Cyberspace Administration of China, ‘Guojia xinxihua fazhan zhanlüe gangyao’ (Outline of the National 
Informatization Development Strategy), July 27, 2016. Translation available at: 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/07/27/outline-of-the-national-informatization-
development-strategy/ (accessed 11/06/2017) 
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expressed in almost all documents discussed above. The recent ‘“13th Five-Year Plan” for National 
Informatization’ talks of the plan of “Building data centres covering the entire country, linked together 
smoothly. … [which will be] bringing together three kinds of data, from netizens, enterprises and 
governments, [with the aim of] rais[ing] the timeliness, completeness and accuracy of information.” 41 
Still, apart from some examples given in the Wuxi Document which only show limited details 
of the plans, the actual scope or nature of many of the sought-for IoT applications, and how exactly 
they will fit in the wider “informatizisation” plan, is still not very clear. Therefore, I will turn to the 
more practical IoT implementation policy documents in the next section in order to scrutinize concrete 
cases of IoT-usage as described in these documents.  
 
5.3. Implementing “Reading China”: Spreading models 
From the start of the Chinese IoT-policy in around 2009 until the moment of study, I count 
five documents which I consider being part of the more practical IoT-development policy. Often 
laying out precise development plans, with certain deadlines and the required means and measures of 
how to get there, these plans are mostly being published by the MIIT and the NDRC. In this section I 
will discuss the examples given in these plans in order to be able to scrutinize what exactly these plans 
of e.g. “improving social management and public service” or other seemingly intrusive schemes are in 
which the IoT is to be used. 
The first document to set the tone is the “Notice Concerning the Printing and Distributing of 
the “Internet of Things ‘Twelfth Five-Year Plan’ Development Plan”, issued by MIIT in 2011.42 The 
document refers to the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” and the “Decision on Accelerating the Fostering and 
Development of Strategic Emerging Industries”, and thus also calls the IoT a “strategic and rising new 
industry, which has an important use in the accelerated promoting of transforming the way of 
economic development.” 
                                                     
41 State Council, ‘Guanyu “shisanwu” guojia xinxihua guihua de tongzhi’ ("13th Five-Year Plan" for National 
Informatization), December 27, 2016. 
42 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, ‘Guanyu yinfa “wulianwang “shierwu” fazhan guihua” de 
tongzhi’ (Notice Concerning the Printing and Distributing of the “Internet of Things ‘Twelfth Five-Year Plan’ 
Development Plan), November 28, 2011. 
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The focus of the document is on which “core technologies” of the IoT are to be developed, the 
importance of the setting of international technical standards, and how the IoT industry should further 
be developed. These goals are set out in more detail in separate “special columns”. The document does 
mention “social management” but offers no new information. There is one interesting passage in the 
section “Strengthening processing technology research” that shows the range of different data that will 
be available through different IoT-applications. It states to “Greatly support research suitable for 
storing and processing the great volume of IoT data, as well as data mining, smart image and video 
analysis technologies.”  
The so-far most comprehensive policy document on IoT-development, is the “Notice on Print 
and Distribute 10 Internet of Things Development Special Action Plan” issued by multiple agencies in 
2013.43 As the Action Plan encompasses so many aspects of life and public police, that’s why it is 
being carried by such a wide range of organizations, including e.g. the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Public Security, and of course the MIIT, but also many other governmental bodies as well 
as research institutes. The Plan comes with two attachments, of which the second one is very large and 
detailed on every topic related to IoT-development. The second attachment also includes a detailed list 
explaining which organizations are responsible for what topic or task exactly. 
In the “Usage Promotion Special Action Plan (2013-2015)”-section, the wide range of areas in 
which IoT-technology and applications should be developed is restated, as well as the focal role the 
“Wuxi National Sensing Net Innovation Model Area” in the creation of pilot projects with “strong 
influence power”. These areas are laid out in the “Important tasks” and contain the following: the 
smartization of industrial production and management capabilities, the refinement of agricultural 
production and the management of produce distribution, the smartization and standardization of 
logistic management, the monitoring of pollution sources and the ecosystem, the monitoring and 
internetization of safety in production and supervising trends, traffic management and smartization of 
service, the smartization and refinement of resource management, irrigation information collection and 
processing, guarding public security and supervising trends, for use of hospital management and 
                                                     
43 National Development and Reform Commission et al., ‘Guanyu yinfa 10 ge wulianwang fazhan zhuanxiang 
xingdong jihua de tongzhi’ (Notice Concerning the Printing and Distributing 10 Internet of Things Development 
Special Action Plan), September 5, 2013. 
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community medical and health services, the refinement of cities basic facilities management, and for 
use of smart home appliances. 
This wide range of areas on closer look shows how all these areas are of great importance to 
China as they all deal with large and persistent issues in Chinese society, such as ensuring food and 
resource security (in a nation with so many mouths to feed and houses to provide electricity for etc.), 
tackling pollution (e.g. all the smog, flooding, and desertification which are major long term 
challenges for the country), and resolving persistent traffic problems (such as the many traffic jams in 
big cities). But others examples in these “tasks” are even more revealing. Such as the “guarding public 
security and supervising trends”, where the IoT is summoned to help deal with issues of food safety, 
which entails ensuring the quality of meat, vegetables, ingredients for Chinese medicine, alcohol and 
even baby milk powder. As there have been many food scandals in China which e.g. also involved 
baby milk powder and which caused a national uproar, the issue of ensuring food safety becomes 
important enough for Chinese policymakers to include it in these plans as to have some IoT-
application help resolve it.  
Other “tasks” are for the IoT to be used to “develop usage models for safeguarding important 
happenings and places, controlling the entirety of motor vehicles, managing the floating population, 
and for preventing and controlling and have an early warning system for the occurrence of sudden 
public incidents in the center of cities,”. What is described here are plenty of instances of monitoring 
and surveillance, which could possibly go as far as using this technology to create better ways of 
preventing people from taking to the streets to protest, as was also the case in documents discussed in 
the previous section.  
The document also states which institutions have the main task of acting on each different task, 
as well as providing some extra information regarding the task. E.g., for the last case described here, it 
stated that the Ministry of Public Security should perform it, and should “as early basic work, set up 
two model constructions in 2014, to in 2015 start to gradually widen the model cases”. This is 
described for every separate task, so also for e.g. which institutions are charged with ensuring 
“military-civil integration”. 
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A notice published by the General Office of the NDRC in late 2013 offers little new insights 
into how precisely, and in what fields, the IoT should be further developed, but just rehashes the 
guiding policy as for it to be implemented correctly in the pilot projects that the NRDC aims to 
promote.44 A joint notice published by the General Office of MIIT and the General Office of the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) does provide some more insights as it, due to its technical nature, 
discusses many technologies and precise areas of IoT-usage.45  
Besides the many technical details and standards, the document discusses a similar content as 
the “Notice on Print and Distribute 10 Internet of Things Development Special Action Plan”; such as 
IoT-applications for tackling pollution in the form of air and water quality meters, food safety 
measures, or medical aid where the IoT e.g. could be used for medical check-ups from a distance. 
Furthermore, it mentions other things such as telematics and telematics security, and “long-distance 
family safekeeping and guarding systems” which include IoT devices (such as a wristband) to track 
the location of the elderly and children. 
All of the points that have already been put forward in many guiding documents discussed in 
the first section and some of the more concrete examples discussed in this section, are found in the 
notice “MIIT 2014 Internet of Things Work Main Points”, published by the General Office of MIIT.46 
In the attachment it again gives an outline of all the important elements of IoT development, such as 
the importance of cooperation between ministries, industries, and the military (in the form of 
“military-civil integration”), which is explicitly stated to be necessary for the purpose of data sharing. 
Another key aspect that resurfaces in this text is the importance of pilot projects to test IoT-
applications for certain uses so they may be used elsewhere, with Wuxi as a focal point for developing 
these pilots.  
                                                     
44 National Development and Reform Commission General Office, ‘Guanyu zuzhi kaizhan 2014-2016 nian 
guojia wulianwang zhongda yingyong shifan gongcheng quyu shidian gongzuo de tongzhi’ (Notice concerning 
the Organizing and Launching of the 2014-2016 National Internet of Things Important Application Model 
Project Area Pilot Work), October 31, 2013. 
45 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology General Office and Ministry of Finance General Office, 
‘Guanyu zuohao 2014 nian wulianwang  fazhan zhuanxiang zijin xiangmu shenbao gongzuo de tongzhi’ (Notice 
Concerning the Proper Handling of the 2014 Internet of Things Development Special Fund Declaration), May 4, 
2014. 
46 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology General Office, ‘Guanyu yinfa “gongyehexinxihuabu 2014 
nian wulianwang gongzuo yaodian” de tongzhi’ (Notice Concerning the Printing and Distributing the “Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology 2014 Internet of Things Work Main Points”), May 21, 2014. 
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Interesting is that in the section at the top of the document, where it outlines to which 
administrative units the document applies, the responsible department for industry and informatization 
of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is mentioned separately, as is in some other of the 
documents discussed in this section. The only other separate mentioned entity is the Wuxi National 
Sensing Net Innovation Model Area. As the Wuxi area is used for the economic development, could 
the area in Xinjiang also be used for testing out some of these IoT applications, but than in a much 
different political context? Perhaps due to the volatile situation in Xinjiang, the IoT-devices and 
technologies used there have to do more with surveillance and crowd-control? This is nowhere stated 
in these documents but the IoT does allow for very advanced surveillance capabilities so it is 
important to note how these devices can be used in different circumstances and for what purposes.47  
 
5.4. Improved governance through surveillance?    
The examples given here, although few and not always very detailed, already show how the 
IoT is envisioned by Chinese policymakers to constitute a possibly large part of the solution of solving 
even “hard problems” such as the battle against pollution, food security (in the sense of providing 
enough food for the Chinese population), and persistent traffic congestion. Some of the applications 
mentioned in these documents however, such as the location-tracking for the elderly and children, look 
odd next to all the other issues which no doubt are of greater national concern. Nonetheless, through 
the setting up of elaborate policy and by pushing for pilot projects to be tried and tested in many areas, 
the state is very involved in the calling for development of the IoT as it is of such strategic importance 
to it. 
Other examples in some of these texts show a glimpse of what could be the other side of 
possibilities afforded by these technologies, and in which could thus also be of interest to the state. E.g. 
what is described in the “Special Action Plan” of 2013 constitute plenty of instances of far-reaching 
                                                     
47 This is only speculation but the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is known for its crucial role in the 
sinification of Xinjiang and could therefore operate as a base for testing new techniques of surveillance and 
control (cf. McMillen 1981; Seymour 2000; Zenz and Leibold 2017). Recently, it has gotten involved in the 
“Belt Road Initiative” to aid agricultural and technological development in neighboring countries such as 
Pakistan and Tajikistan (FT 2017; Xinhua 2017). 
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monitoring and surveillance capabilities. Such as the above mentioned “models for safeguarding 
important happenings and places, controlling the entirety of motor vehicles, managing the floating 
population, and for preventing and controlling and have an early warning system for the occurrence of 
sudden public incidents in the center of cities,” If more devices and vehicles get connected to the 
internet, the monitoring of individuals and larger groups will soon be in reach, and Chinese 
policymakers are aiming to be able to have these capabilities.  
As Zeng (2016) has described, the Chinese government already constructed one of the most 
expensive and sophisticated closed-circuit television (CCTV) networks on the planet, consisting of 
millions of panoramic cameras in public spaces working 24 hours a day, seven days a week, covering 
highways, public parks, public transport and taxis, lifts and public streets.48 Moreover, as early as 2011, 
the government could track the precise movement of 17 million people in Beijing using the signal of 
these people’s phones (Cheng 2014). When using phones, surveillance cameras, these devices all 
already constitute the IoT. However, as the amount of devices each person owns increases, or more 
cameras are build, or by “smartification” in general; many other mundane processes will also record 
and monitor people’s activities more closely.  
Therefore, the Chinese government is doing good work to keep up with these developments 
and to try to use these opportunities to its advantage. E.g., in the “Notice Concerning the Printing and 
Distributing of the “Internet of Things ‘Twelfth Five-Year Plan” Development Plan” the call is made 
for developing better techniques of IoT data storage and processing and data mining, smart image and 
video analysis technologies. These are all technologies that are crucial in a “smart world” where 
everything is being datafied and recorded.  If we combine these plans with other plans mentioned in 
more recent technology policy, the picture gets clearer yet again. E.g. in the “artificial intelligence” 
section of the “Internet Plus” plan is mentioned: “Support security protection enterprises to launch 
cooperation with Internet enterprises to develop and popularize accurate image recognition and other 
                                                     
48 The government even boasts that in Beijing, thanks to at least 30 million cameras and the participation of 
4,000 police, they manage to monitor 100 per cent of public streets (Zhang 2015). That is, if the pollution does 
not get in the way (Hall 2013). 
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such big data analysis technologies, and enhance the intelligence and service levels of security 
protection products.”49 
With techniques such as advanced image recognition (of which facial recognition is an 
important part) that get better every year, there will be no more hiding your identity, as it will be 
possible to be identified (and have your actions recorded) almost everywhere where there will be a 
camera or sensor.50 Facial recognition is already being used in train stations in China to check if 
people’s tickets match the person,51 or soon it will be possible to pay by just showing your face.52 
Speech recognition is already being used to identify criminals using phone scams, but this technology 
can of course also be used to identify basically anyone using their voice.53  
All these possible avenues for monitoring and surveillance, from the more economic-
motivated ones to the ones described here, all show how there exists an irresistible urge within the 
Chinese leadership to try to control its environment more, with the aim of obtaining better governance 
capabilities in every sense. But what “better governance” means, is only determined by the Party itself. 
It remains to be seen if these technologies really would allow for such great control-
mechanisms, but they definitely can already make a big change in people’s behavior. If your identity is 
not even safe by using your voice or showing your face somewhere, all these schemes are prone to 
having very chilling effects on people’s sense of freedom to express themselves or take part in any 
kind of association or activity. Moreover, there are real dangers associated with relying ever more on 
digital technology, as technology and devices can malfunction, be short of energy supply, or be hacked 
to steal its information or be tampered with. Moreover, the danger of using biometrics is that once 
people’s accounts or information linked to their face, voice or fingerprint is leaked or stolen, it is near 
                                                     
49 State Council, “‘Hulianwang+’ xingdong”. 
50 Of course, many other actions already make it easy to identify a person, such as credit card records etc. (cf. 
Schneier 2015). 
51 “Face recognition ticket checking comes to Beijing West Railway Station” China Daily, November 30, 2016. 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-11/30/content_27529029.htm (accessed 11/06/2017). 
52  “Face-detecting systems in China now authorize payments, provide access to facilities, and track down 
criminals. Will other countries follow?”, MIT Technology Review. 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603494/10-breakthrough-technologies-2017-paying-with-your-face/ 
(accessed 11/06/2017). 
53  “Minitrue: “Voiceprint Analysis Can Recognize Swindlers”” China Digital Times, February 28, 2017. 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2017/02/minitrue-delete-article-voiceprint-analysis-can-recognize-swindlers/ 
(accessed 11/06/2017). 
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impossible to change your biometrics to prevent harm being done to your person or information.54 
Crucial to the government’s plans of “informatization” therefore is the need for reliable and 
“controllable” systems, of which proper security is the most important trait.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
54 “The end of passwords: biometrics are coming but do risks outweigh benefits?” The Guardian. December 8, 
2015. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/08/the-end-of-passwords-biometrics-risks-benefits 
(Accessed 11/06/2017) 
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6. Conclusion 
The IoT, as a promising new turn in the ICTs-landscape, could potentially transform many 
economic and societal processes previously not connected or recorded by internet connection. As 
China is putting such great emphasis on using the power of ICTs to develop its economy and society, 
the IoT is just the next logical step on its path of modernization. In the policy-documents analyzed 
here, the strategic importance of the IoT is clearly stated as it is being summoned to transform 
anything from manufacturing to medical care and government services. With the IoT and related 
technology (such as big data, the cloud, mobile technology and data storage) rapidly developing, the 
ambitions of the Chinese leadership embodied in these documents, is to follow, or even lead these 
trends and use these technologies to increase its grasp over, it seems, as much as possible of all 
economic and social processes.  
These documents show the wide scope of envisioned IoT-applications, as they range from 
schemes to increase the state’s grasp on much of the population through manifold surveillance systems, 
to schemes to tackle quite specific and persistent problems in China today, such as food safety and 
pollution. Military-civil integration is also stated as an important requisite for IoT-development, 
showing that the Chinese state is very serious about its very elaborate plans of “informatization”. 
Ultimately, the goal seems to be to create a predictable environment where the state will never be 
surprised by sudden bursts of discontent, mass mobilization, or economic turmoil. As successful 
models of using IoT for the purposes of creating feedback and surveillance spread to the whole of 
China; by controlling all the information through the networks of cameras, sensors and other data 
points, the central leadership will be in a much better position to act on this information and increase 
its governing capacity – if these plans will be implemented successfully that is.   
These plans however are not without risks. As the state becomes more reliant on this data, it, 
together with the technology, will have to prove trustworthy to not give a skewed representation of 
reality. Moreover, the ability to ensure the security of these systems will become paramount as 
everything becomes connected and many vulnerabilities and technical issues still persevere – 
especially with the still developing IoT. Therefore, the recent turn towards improved cybersecurity in 
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Chinese policy is already noteworthy but more specific action on IoT-security is still mostly lacking. 
This is due to change in the near future: with many efforts recently being made to implement a 
comprehensive, holistic cybersecurity policy effort, more specific IoT-security policy is sure to also 
come. This could give much food for further research, but unfortunately fell out of the scope of this 
thesis.   
This study has shown the importance of studying Chinese technology policy documents in the 
face of the great ambitions of the Chinese top leadership to become the world’s leading innovator and 
information society, and as new technology catches up much faster with solid scholarship. However, 
only studying policy documents only shows part of the picture of a quickly developing nation and 
economy. Therefore, it is important to complement these studies with proper case studies and work on 
the ground to see the actual implementation of these plans. In doing so, more light can be shed on the 
role of the private sector in making the myriad plans of “informatization” a success, and to which 
extent it works together with the government in mutual interest.  
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7. Appendix 
General policy documents 
IoT-specific policy documents 
Date of publication Policy document Releasing institution 
10/10/2010 Decision on Accelerating the Fostering and 
Development of Strategic Emerging Industries (关于
加快培育和发展战略性新兴产业的决定) 
State Council 
14/03/2011 Twelfth Five-Year Guideline (第十二个五年规划纲
要) 
National People’s 
Congress 
28/11/2011 Notice Concerning the Printing and Distributing of the 
“Internet of Things ‘Twelfth Five-Year Plan’ 
Development Plan (关于印发《物联网“十二五”发展
规划》的通知) 
MIIT 
5/08/2012 Official Reply Concerning the Wuxi National Sensing 
Net Innovation Model Area Development Plan Outline 
(2012-2020) (关于无锡国家传感网创新示范区发展
规划纲要（2012-2020年）的批复) 
State Council 
17/08/2012 Wuxi National Sensing Net Innovation Model Area 
Development Plan Outline (2012-2020) (无锡国家传
感网创新示范区发展规划纲要（2012-2020年）) 
MIIT 
5/02/2013 Guiding Opinions Concerning Promoting the Orderly 
and Healthy Development of the Internet of Things 
(关于推进物联网有序健康发展的指导意见) 
State Council 
5/09/2013 Notice on the Printing and Distributing 10 Internet of 
Things Development Special Action Plan (关于印发
10个无联网发展专项行动计划的通知) 
NDRC, MIIT, MOE, 
MOST, MPS, MOF, 
MLR, MOC, …  
31/10/2013 Notice concerning the Organizing and Launching of 
the 2014-2016 National Internet of Things Important 
Application Model Project Area Pilot Work (关于组
织开展 2014-2016年国家物联网重大应用示范工程
区域试点工作的通知) 
NDRC 
4/05/2014 Notice Concerning the Proper Handling of the 2014 
Internet of Things Development Special Fund 
Declaration (关于做好 2014年物联网发展专项资金
项目申报工作的通知) 
MIIT, MOF 
21/05/2014 Notice Concerning the Printing and Distributing the 
“Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
2014 Internet of Things Work Main Points” (关于印
发《工业和信息化部 2014年物联网工作要点》的
通知) 
MIIT 
24/06/2014 Nationwide Internet of Things Work Television 
Conference Call Speech Draft (全国物联网工作电视
电话会议各级领导讲话整理稿) 
State Council 
5/03/2015 2015 Government Work Report (2015年政府工作报
告) 
State Council 
5/07/2015 Guiding Opinions Concerning Vigorously Promoting State Council 
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“Internet Plus” Activities (关于积极推进“互联网+”
行动的指导意见) 
27/07/2016 Outline of the National Informatization Development 
Strategy (国家信息化发展战略纲要) 
CAC 
27/12/2016 "13th Five-Year Plan" for National Informatization 
(“十三五”国家信息化规划) 
State Council 
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